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Abstract
Previous work has shown that the perception of a graspable object may automatically potentiate actions that are tailored to
specific action-related features of the object (e.g., its size) and may be related to its immediate grasping as well as to its long-term,
functional use. We investigated the neural correlates of function- and size-related object affordances that may be concurrently
potentiated by a graspable object. Participants were lying in a MR scanner holding a large switch in one hand and a small switch
in the other hand. They passively attended a large or a small object with clearly separated functional and graspable end that was
displayed centrally at an average angle of 45 degrees. Participants responded to the direction of an arrow that was overlaid on the
object after a mean period of 1,000 ms after object onset and was pointing to the left or to the right with equal probability.
Response times were shorter when the arrow pointed to the functional end of the object and when the responses were made with
the switch that was congruent to the size of the perceived object. A clear distinction was found in the representation of function-
and size-related affordances; the former was represented in the posterior parietal cortex and the latter in prefrontal, premotor, and
primary sensorimotor cortices. We conclude that different aspects of object-directed actions may be automatically potentiated by
individual object features and are represented in distinct brain areas.
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Introduction
The particular status of tools for human behavior is not only
reflected by how we reason about them but also by how our
brain responds to tool stimuli (Vaesen, 2012). Compared with
other object categories, such as animals, houses, or faces, tool
stimuli elicit extra-temporal activation in frontal and parietal
regions that have been associated with motor processes (Chao
et al., 1999; Chao and Martin, 2000; Creem-Regerh and Lee,
2005). Remarkably, tools seem to activate these motor-related
regions automatically, that is, upon passive observation of a
viewer who has no intention to interact with the perceived
tool. This automaticity is akin to the phenomenon of motor
affordance, in which the mere perception of a graspable object
facilitates motor responses that are congruent with certain
qualities of the object, such as its size or orientation (Ellis
and Tucker, 2000; Phillips and Ward, 2002; Tucker and
Ellis, 1998, 2001). At a clinical level, the automatic nature
of uninhibited motor affordances can be observed in patients
with manual groping or utilization behavior that compels the
patient’s hand to follow, grasp, or use objects (Lhermitte,
1983).
The potentiation of an action that is afforded by an object
may occur automatically (Tucker and Ellis, 1998), but it also
depends on a number of factors, such as the allocation of
attention to the object as a whole (Riggio et al., 2008) or to
an action-relevant feature of the object (Pellicano et al., 2010),
the hand shaping of the prospective actor (Ansuini et al.,
2008), and also the graspability (Symes et al., 2007) and the
reachability of the object (Costantini et al., 2010). Multiple
features of an object can be processed in parallel (Duncan,
1984) and can induce concurrent representation of actions,
which may be related to different structural features and/to
the skillful use of the object (i.e., Bstructural/volumetric
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affordances vs. Bfunctional affordances^) (Binkofski and
Buxbaum, 2013; Bub et al., 2008; Jax and Buxbaum, 2010).
Object affordances also can be categorized on the basis of
whether they are derived from time-invariant or from tempo-
rary features of an object (see Bstable^ vs. Bvariable^
affordances) (Borghi and Riggio, 2009, 2015).
The objective of our experiment was to investigate, by
means of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
the neural correlates of action representations that are related
to the immediate grasping (i.e., size-related affordances) and
the long-term skillful use (i.e., function-related affordances) of
an object—when a person pays attention to the object but has
no intention to act upon it. Our experimental design was based
on the designs used in the Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Ellis
and Tucker (2000) studies, which showed that object-directed
actions are intrinsic to the representation of an object. An
object, either a large or a small one, was presented centrally
on a computer monitor, tilted at an average angle of 45°
(range: 30-60°) and in such a way that the graspable part of
the object was located at the lower (left or right) quadrant of
the monitor and the functional part of the object at the opposite
upper quadrant. It should be noted that we use the term
Bfunctional part^ to refer to the part of the object that signifies
the object’s function/identity (e.g., the blade of a knife, the
head of a hammer, etc.). Participants were lying in the MR
scanner holding a large response switch in one hand and a
small response switch in the other hand. The participants were
not instructed to attend specific features of the object but rath-
er to attend the object as a whole and only respond to the
direction of an arrow that was overlaid on the object after an
average time interval of 1,000 ms after object onset. The re-
sponse was made by pressing the switch that was spatially
congruent to the direction of the arrow. We hypothesized that
the size of the displayed object would automatically activate
the representation of the corresponding grasping action. Such
representation should facilitate a size congruent response and
interfere with a size incongruent response. For example, the
display of a small object should activate the representation of a
precision grip, and the participants should be faster at
responding with the small switch (held with a precision grip)
compared to responding with the large switch (held with a
power grip). With regards to the potentiation of action related
to the long-term functional use of an object, we drew our
predictions from a recent EEG study with a similar experi-
mental design and stimuli (Kourtis and Vingerhoets, 2015),
which showed that the functional part of the object (e.g., the
head of a hammer) first captured a passive observer’s attention
and then potentiated a spatially compatible response (see also,
Bub et al., 2008; Pellicano et al., 2010). Accordingly, we
expected that the participants would be faster responding to
an arrow pointing to the functional end of a displayed object.
Previous neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the
posterior parietal cortex (PPC) is integral in object perception,
planning of object-directed actions, and in the representation
of visuomotor affordances (Grèzes and Decety, 2002; Grèzes
et al., 2003; Vingerhoets, 2008, 2014). The PPC is part of the
dorsal processing stream of visual information, which is tra-
ditionally associated with spatial representation/localization
(Bwhere^) and movement guidance (Bhow^), and it is func-
tionally complementary to the ventral processing stream,
which is associated with abstract knowledge about objects
and their spatial relationships (Bwhat^) (Goodale and Milner,
1992; Milner and Goodale, 2008; Ungerleider and Mishkin,
1982). More recently, Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003) put for-
ward the theory that the dorsal stream may consist of two
distinct pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway, which is responsi-
ble for the online control of action (the BGrasp^ system, relat-
ed to structure-based affordances), and of a ventro-dorsal
pathway responsible for the purposeful use of objects based
on stored knowledge (the BUse^ system, related to function-
based affordances) (Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013; Buxbaum
and Kalenine, 2010). Such distinction is also consistent with
the conceptual categorization of affordances on the basis of
the temporal (in)variability of object features (Borghi and
Riggio, 2009). BStable^ affordances that are driven by
existing knowledge of an object’s time-invariant features seem
to be predominantly represented in the ventro-dorsal pathway,
whereas Bvariable^ affordances that are related to the process-
ing of temporary object features (e.g., its orientation) seem to
be represented in the dorso-dorsal pathway (Sakreida et al.,
2016).
In addition to PPC, passive viewing of a graspable object
activates occipital and temporal areas—associated with object
recognition and identification processes (Milner and Goodale,
1995), prefrontal areas, associated with decision-making pro-
cesses, and more importantly premotor and primary motor
areas (Chao and Martin, 2000; Grèzes and Decety, 2002;
Grèzes et al., 2003; Valyear et al., 2012; Vingerhoets et al.,
2013). Such activation patterns indicates that passive viewing
of an object does not only involve the processing of its visual
properties and its identity, but it also induces the representa-
tion of actions that are afforded by specific features of the
object. Accordingly, we expected that the display of a grasp-
able object would activate an extended cortical network asso-
ciated with immediate object grasping and long-term skillful
use and we sought to examine whether these two type of




Twenty-two healthy volunteers participated in the study. Two
participants were excluded from the analyses due to head
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movements that exceeded the size of a functional voxel (>3
mm), and an additional participant was excluded due to un-
stable handling of the large response switch. The 19 remaining
participants were 11 women and 8 men with a mean age of
22.2 (range: 19-27) years. All were right-handed as deter-
mined by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory: M = 89.7%,
SD = 12.6% (Oldfield, 1971), and none had a history of neu-
rological or psychiatric disease. Scanning protocols were ap-
proved by the local ethics committee, and all subjects gave
written, informed consent after the experimental procedure
had been explained.
Procedure
Before scanning, the participants completed a pre-scan MRI-
safety questionnaire and the EdinburghHandedness Inventory
and provided informed consent for their participation in the
study. Next, the participants were positioned head first and
supine in the magnet with their left and right arms placed
alongside the body on the scanner table. The participants were
holding a largeMR-compatible response switch using a power
grip in one hand (Fig. 1, left) and a small MR-compatible
response switch using a precision grip in the other hand
(Fig. 1, right). Of the 19 remaining participants, 11 held the
large switch with their right hand and the small switch with
their left hand, and 8 held the large switch with their left hand
and the small switch with their right hand.
The participants’ heads were gently fixed in place with
foam cushions. Participants were reminded of the fact that
MR imaging is very sensitive to movement and that they were
required to restrict head movements and to lie as still as pos-
sible. Stimulus presentation was controlled using Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., Berkeley, CA) syn-
chronized with the MRI scanner. The stimuli were back
projected on a screen at the back of the magnet bore and
viewed via a mirror attached to the head coil. After the end
of the experiment, the participants completed a post-scanMRI
safety questionnaire and were debriefed regarding the purpose
of the study.
Experimental Paradigm
Each experimental trial started with the display of a photo of a
small (e.g., key, pin, etc.) or a large object (e.g., axe, screw-
driver, etc.). The object was displayed centrally and titled at an
angle of an average of 45° (range: 30-60°), with its graspable
part located either at the left or at the right lower visual quad-
rant with equal probability and its functional part at the oppo-
site higher quadrant. The size of the objects varied between 12
and 20 cm for the large objects and between 4 and 8 cm for the
small objects for them to look graspable either with a power
grip (large objects) or with a precision grip (small objects),
within reach to the participants and also to correspond to a
large extent to their actual average size in everyday life (e.g., a
spoon cannot be the same size as a hammer). The duration of
an object’s display varied randomly between 500 and
1,500 ms with a step increment of 250 ms, after which a black
arrow was overlaid on the object. The arrow pointed to the left
or to the right with equal probability. The participants were
instructed to gaze at the centre of the screen and pay attention
to the object. No specific instruction was given related to the
part or feature of the object that they had to attend to. They
also were asked to respond swiftly by pressing the switch,
which was held at the side pointed by the arrow head. After
the participants’ response, the stimulus was replaced by a
centrally presented fixation cross, which remained on display
until the onset of the following cue stimulus. The time interval
between the arrow onset and the start of the next trial was
2,000 ms.
There were 50 large and 50 small objects in total (Table 1).
Each object was presented four times: twice with the function-
al part on the left side and twice on the right side. To ensure
that the participants were paying attention to the object, we
Fig. 1 Two examples of experimental trials. Top: The participant holds
the small switch with the right hand and the large switch with the left
hand. A large object is displayed on the screen for a variable time period,
ranging from 500 to 1500 ms, after which an arrow is overlaid on the
object pointing either left or right. Responses with the left hand would be
size congruent (large object – large switch) but function incongruent,
because the arrow points away from the object’s handle. Conversely,
responses with the right hand would be size incongruent but function
congruent. Down: The participant holds the large switch with the right
hand and the small switch with the left hand. In this case, responses with
the left hand would be size incongruent and function incongruent,
whereas a responses with the right hand would be size congruent and
function congruent
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introduced Bcatch^ trials, consisting of the photo of an animal,
to which participants were instructed to respond immediately
with both hands. There were 20 animals in total; each was
presented twice, with its head either on the left or right side.
Overall, the experiment consisted of 440 randomly presented
trials (i.e., 100 trials/condition), 40 of which were catch trials.
We investigated two types of response congruency based
on two different features of an object (Fig. 2). The first type
was size congruency, which refers to the correspondence be-
tween the size of the object and the size of the response switch.
For example, when a large object was on display, a size con-
gruent (SC) response would be the pressing of the large switch
and a size incongruent (SInC) response the pressing of the
small switch. The second type was spatial congruency, which
refers to the correspondence between the location of the func-
tional part of an object (e.g., the blade of a knife) and the
location of the responding hand. To distinguish it from the
spatial congruency that refers to the correspondence between
the locations of the graspable part of an object (e.g., the handle
of a knife) and the location of the responding hand, we will
use the term Bfunction congruency.^ For example, when the
functional part of the object was located at the right side, a
function congruent (FC) response would be a right-hand re-
sponse and a function incongruent (FInC) response would be a
left-hand response. Based on these different types of congru-
ency, we defined four experimental conditions in which a
response could either be: i) size congruent and function con-
gruent (SC-FC); ii) size congruent and function incongruent
(SC-FInC); iii) size incongruent and function incongruent
Table 1 List of objects that were used as stimuli
Small objects Large objects
Binder clip 1 Binder clip 2 Axe Bottle opener 1
Binder clip 3 Small glue tube Bottle opener 2 Bottle opener 3
Hairclip 1 Hairclip 2 Long brush 1 Long brush 2
Bobby pin 1 Bobby pin 2 Long brush 3 Hair brush
Key 1 Key 2 Clothes brush Cable stripper 1
Key 3 Key 4 Cable stripper 2 Meat clever
Lipstick 1 Lipstick 2 Egg beater Frying pan
Nail clipper 1 Nail clipper 2 Garlic crusher Hammer 1
Nail clipper 3 Nail clipper 4 Hammer 2 Hammer 3
Eyebrow tweezers 1 Eyebrow tweezers 2 Hammer 4 Drill
Pen 1 Pen 2 Ice cream scoop Spatula 1
Match 1 Match 2 Spatula 2 Spatula 3
Nail 1 Nail 2 Nut cracker Paper cutter
Nail 3 Clothes peg 1 Ripping pincher Pliers 1
Clothes Peg 2 Memory stick Pliers 2 Pliers 3
Push pin 1 Push pin 2 Saw 1 Saw 2
Push pin 3 Eyebrow tweezers Saw 3 Screwdriver 1
Needle 1 Needle 2 Screwdriver 2 Screwdriver 3
Needle 3 Screw 1 Letter opener Sickle
Screw 2 Screw 3 Pasta Ladle Wrench 1
Screw 4 Coffee stirrer 1 Wrench 2 Wrench 3
Coffee stirrer 2 Coffee stirrer 3 Wrench 4 Trowel
Pencil 1 Pencil 2 Knife 1 Knife 2
Paperclip 1 Paperclip 2 Knife 2 Potato masher
Small Allen key Slim tin opener Chisel 1 Chisel 2
Fig. 2 Response times. SC, size congruent; SInC, size incongruent; FC,
function congruent; FInC, function incongruent. The asterisk depicts the
significant function-related affordance effect. The error bars represent
standard error of mean
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(SInC-FC); or iv) size incongruent and function incongruent
(SInC-FInC).
Scanning procedure
Scanning was performed at 3.0 T on a Siemens Trio MRI
scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) that
was equipped with echo planar imaging (EPI) capabilities and
used a 32-channel head coil for radio frequency transmission
and signal reception. After automatic shimming of the mag-
netic field on each participant, a 3-D high-resolution T1 ana-
tomical image of the whole brain in the sagittal plane was
acquired for co-registration with the functional images (3D
MPRAGE, 176 slices, slice thickness = 1.0, in-plane resolu-
tion = 1.0 x 1.0 mm, TR = 2250 ms, TE = 4.18). Next, 590
functional EPI images in the axial plane were acquired. They
had the following parameters: TR = 2.5 s, TE = 27 ms; flip
angle = 62°, 33 slices, slice thickness = 2.5 mm, slice gap =
1.25 mm, FOV = 192 mm and matrix = 64 x 64, resulting in a
resolution of 3 x 3 x 2.5 mm.
Behavioral Analysis
The primary focus of our analyses was the Response Time
(RT), which was defined as the time interval from the onset
of an arrow stimulus until the press of a response switch. Trials
where the participants did not respond or pressed the wrong
switch or where they were too fast or too slow to release the
response keys (i.e., the difference with the mean RTwas larger
than 2 standard deviations in either direction) were removed
from subsequent RT analysis. In addition, we examined the
participants’ errors in cases where the participants failed to
respond or pressed the incorrect switch.
Image analysis
Data analysis was performed using Brain Voyager QX for pre-
processing and statistical inference (Goebel et al., 2006).
Functional data were subjected to a standard sequence of
pre-processing steps comprising slice scan time correction,
3-Dmotion correction by spatial alignment to the first volume,
and temporal filtering using linear trend removal and high
pass filtering for low frequency drifts of three or fewer cycles.
Spatial smoothing with a Gaussian filter (FWHM = 8 mm)
was applied for the volume-based analysis. The anatomical
data for each subject were transformed into Talairach standard
space using sinc interpolation. The functional data for each
subject were co-registered with the subject’s 3-D anatomical
dataset and transformed into Talairach space.
The volume time course was then subjected to an indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) to define noise predictors for
use in the General Linear Model (GLM) design matrix. For
each participant, a protocol file representing the onset and
duration of each event for the different conditions was de-
rived. Factorial design matrices were defined automatically
from the created protocols. The BOLD response in each con-
dition wasmodeled by convolving the defined conditions with
a canonical hemodynamic response function (gamma) to form
the main predictors in the GLM. After exclusion of potentially
task-related components (r >|0.30|), we added the remaining
ICA components as predictors-of-no-interest to the GLM de-
sign matrix. Finally, we applied a cortex-based mask that was
created from the averaged anatomical scans of all volunteers.
After the GLM had been fitted, t-maps were generated to
evaluate the effects of relevant contrasts. As we expected
between-contrast differences to be subtle, we used cluster-
based inference to correct for multiple comparisons. The
method exploits the fundamental assumption that areas of ac-
tivity tend to stimulate signal changes over spatially contigu-
ous groups of voxels rather than over sparsely isolated voxels.
A minimum cluster size of 10 voxels (at p = 0.005 (uncorrect-
ed)) has been recommended by some authors (Lieberman and
Cunningham, 2009), but we applied a more stringent combi-
nation of an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001 in all analyses
with a minimal voxel threshold of 27 voxels (3 x 3 x 3 mm).
This threshold setting resulted in a minimal t-value of 3.92 for
a voxel to be considered significant. In short, we consider the
likelihood that 27 adjacent voxels being active at or above this
threshold is above chance in a whole brain analysis investi-
gating differences between slightly different conditions.
We sought for clusters of significant activation for compar-
isons between function congruent (FC) trials versus function
incongruent (FInC) trials and for size congruent (SC) trials
versus size incongruent (SInC) trials. Thus, we examined four
different contrasts: i) SC > SInC; ii) SInc > SC; iii) FC > FInC;
and iv) FInC > FC.
Results
Response Times
The response times (RTs) were 387.4 ms (SD = 30.3) for SC-
FC responses, 389.2 ms (SD = 33.0) for SInC-FC responses,
393.4 ms (SD = 33.5) for SC-FInC responses, and 397.3 ms
(SD = 31.2) for SInC-FInC responses (Fig. 2). A preliminary
analysis showed that there was no difference between holding
the large switch with the right hand and the small switch with
the left hand compared to the opposite configuration (p =
0.908). Statistical comparisons were made using a 2 x 2 x 2
repeated measures ANOVA, with the factors: Switch size
(large vs. small switch), Size Congruency (SC vs. SInC),
and Function Congruency (FC vs. FInC). The analysis re-
vealed a significant main effect of Switch Size [F(1,18) =
36.5, p < 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.670], because responses with the small
switch were significantly faster. More importantly and related
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to the objectives of our study, there was a significant main
effect of Function Congruency [F(1,18) = 12.5, p = 0.002,
ηp
2 = 0.410], because participants were faster when they
responded with the hand at the side of the functional part of
the object. Moreover, the participants were faster to respond
with the switch that corresponded with the size of the
displayed object; however, the main effect of Size
Congruency only showed a trend towards statistical signifi-
cance [F(1,18) = 3.3, p = 0.087, ηp
2 = 0.154]. There was
however a significant two-way interaction between Switch
Size and Size Congruency [F(1,18) = 9.2, p = 0.007, ηp
2 =
0.338].We investigated the origin of this interaction with post-
hoc t-tests (Bonferroni corrected alpha level = 0.025), which
showed that there was a significant effect of Size Congruency
when participants were responding with the small switch
[t(18) = −3.6, p = 0.002], but no effect when responding with
the large switch [t(18) = 1.2, p = 0.231].1 No other interaction
was statistically significant (ps > 0.12). The number of erro-
neous responses was extremely small (1.8%); thus, no statis-
tical analysis was performed on the number of errors.
Neuroimaging Results
All four possible main contrasts related to size and function
congruency (i.e., SC > SInC, SInc > SC, FC > FInC and FInC
> FC) resulted in activation of occipital areas (Brodmann areas
(BA) 18 and 19). In addition, the (FC > FInC) contrast re-
vealed two clusters of activation in the left posterior parietal
cortex (PPC): one cluster in the superior parietal lobule (SPL,
BA 7) and another cluster in the inferior parietal lobule (BA
40). The opposite contrast revealed activation in the left pos-
terior cingulate gyrus (BA23) and the left cerebellum (Lobes
IVand V). Interestingly, PPC activation was not present in the
(SC > SInC) contrast, but instead we observed activation in
the right superior frontal gyrus (BA 9), in the medial superior
frontal gyrus (BA 8), in the left medial frontal gyrus (BA 6),
and also in the boundary between left precentral and
postcentral gyri (BAs 4 and 3) (see Figure 3 for FC > FInC
and SC > SInc contrasts). The opposite contrast (SInC > SC)
revealed activation in the left dorsal premotor cortex (BA 6)
(Figure 3; Table 2).
Discussion
Behavioral Results: the Bfunction congruency^
and Bsize congruency^ effects
Our behavioral analysis revealed the presence of two distinct
affordance effects, which emerged without interacting with
each other: the Bfunction congruency^ effect and the Bsize
congruency^ effect. The first was related to location of the
feature of the object that indicated the function/identity of
the displayed object. The participants were faster to respond
to an arrow pointing to the functional end of the object, which
was located at the opposite side of the object’s grasping part
(i.e., the handle). Although this finding may seem counterin-
tuitive, it is a replication of a recent EEG study (Kourtis and
Vingerhoets, 2015) with a very similar design to the present
study, which differed mainly in that there was no size manip-
ulation (the participants in that study responded by pressing
keys on a computer keyboard). This strongly suggests that the
Bfunction congruency^ effect should not be attributed to the
complexity of the task (i.e., to the concurrent processing of
multiple object features) but rather that it is a genuine effect
showing that the processing of an object’s functional part re-
ceives priority over the processing of its graspable part.
It also may be argued that this effect simply reflects the
directing of attention towards the most perceptually salient
feature of an object and consequently the activation of a re-
sponse code that is spatially compatible with the location of
that feature (Anderson et al., 2002). Although this sounds
plausible (e.g., the functional end of an axe is indeed its more
salient part), it becomes less convincing when we consider the
small objects that were used in our study, the functional part of
which was most often their less salient part (e.g., keys, pins,
nails, etc.). A more likely interpretation is that the Bfunction
congruency^ effect does not depend on saliency per se but
rather reflects the allocation of attention towards the part of
an object that signifies the object’s identity/function (e.g., an
axe is perceived as such because of its blade, not its handle),
and the potentiation of an action related to the long-term use of
the object (Kourtis and Vingerhoets, 2015) and/or possibly the
direction towards such action is performed (Pellicano et al.,
2010).
This finding is an apparent contradiction with previous
studies, which showed that the display of a graspable object
may potentiate an action compatible with the immediate
grasping of the object (Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Tucker and
Ellis, 1998; Vainio et al., 2007). However, this effect is prom-
inent when the observers attend to a feature of an object,
which was, even indirectly, related to the handling of the ob-
ject (Pellicano et al., 2010; Symes et al., 2007; Tipper et al.,
2006), but it does not manifest when attention is directed away
from the object (Vainio et al., 2007) or toward a feature that
has nothing to do with the handling of the object, such as its
color (Pellicano et al., 2010; Tipper et al., 2006). The partic-
ipants in our study were instructed to simply attend an object
as a whole, without paying particular attention to any of the
objects’ grasping-related features, which would explain our
behavioral results. It should be noted that the absence of be-
havioral evidence does not necessarily mean that the location
of the handle of the object did not potentiate a grasping action,
but it is possible that, similar to our previous study (Kourtis
1 We believe that the reason behind this interaction lies on the fact that re-
sponses were faster (~6 ms) when the arrow was overlaid on a small object
compared with a large one (see Discussion).
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and Vingerhoets, 2015), this effect was rather weak and tran-
sient, and it was overshadowed by the stronger functional
affordance effect.
The second behavioral effect was related to the size of the
displayed object. The participants were faster responding with
a type of grip that was the correct one for grasping the
displayed object (e.g., with a precision grip when viewing a
small object). This finding is in agreement with previous stud-
ies that have demonstrated that the size of an object potentiates
a type of grasping action that is congruent to the object’s size
(Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Grèzes, et al., 2003; Derbyshire et al.,
2006). Notably, this effect was present only for responses
made with the small switch but not with the large one. This
could have been partly due to mechanical reasons, because the
pressing of the large switch was a rather cumbersome and
long-lasting action, but it is more likely that it predominantly
reflects the fact that the participants responded faster to an
arrow that was overlaid on a small object. The opposite effect
was reported by Grèzes et al. (2003); those responses were
faster when the stimulus was a large object. However, the
participants in that study responded to the object itself (i.e.,
judging whether the object was manufactured or natural),
whereas in the present study the participants responded to
the direction of an arrow that was displayed on the object. A
likely explanation is that large objects may have acted as
sources of distraction and that might have delayed the detec-
tion of the arrowhead. Nevertheless, faster responses for small
objects correspond to faster size-congruent responses with the
Table 2. Peak voxel coordinates in Talairach space of significant activation clusters of all statistically significant contrasts
Brain Area BA x y Z tmax # of voxels
SC > SInC Left cuneus 18 -6 -97 13 8.19 2434
Right lingual gyrus 18 15 -73 -8 6.96 1919
Right cuneus 18 27 -98 4 5.47 107
Left pre/postcentral gyrus 4,3 -36 -25 61 5.07 63
Right superior frontal gyrus 9 36 47 31 5.06 28
Left lingual gyrus 17 -12 -91 -11 4.97 51
Left medial frontal gyrus 6 -9 -11 55 4.75 40
Superior frontal gyrus 8 0 50 44 4.64 46
SInC > SC Right middle occipital gyrus 18 12 -94 19 11.07 2799
Left fusiform gyrus 18/37 -39 -76 -14 8.06 144
Left lingual gyrus 18 -6 -76 -5 6.13 782
Let middle frontal gyrus 6 -27 11 55 4.80 35
Left fusiform gyrus 19 -30 -67 -8 4.51 39
FC > FInC Left superior parietal lobule 7 -27 -52 52 5.42 40
Left inferior parietal lobule 40 -60 -34 34 4.57 135
Left lingual gyrus 18 -15 -82 -11 4.48 99
Right middle occipital gyrus 19 27 -85 16 4.84 132
FInC > FC Left posterior cingulate gyrus 23 -6 -58 10 5.08 32
Left cuneus 19 -15 -97 23 4.74 99
Cerebellum (IV,V) -3 -40 -8 5.15 35
SC, size congruent; SInC, size incongruent; FC, function congruent; FInC, function incongruent
Fig. 3 Most important fMRI contrasts. Function-related affordances and size-related affordances are represented in distinct brain areas, the former in
posterior parietal cortex and the latter in prefrontal and premotor cortices
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small switch and faster size-incongruent responses with the
large switch. As a consequence, the size-related congruency
effect was enhanced for responses madewith the small switch,
but it was completely disguised (although not reversed) for
responses made with the large switch.
A couple of limitations in the selection of the stimuli need to
be acknowledged. First, the size of each object corresponded to
the size of its grasping part (i.e., a large object had a large grasp-
ing part and a small object had a small grasping part). It is pos-
sible that the size congruency effect might not reflect the corre-
spondence of the type of a grip to the size of the whole object but
only to the size of its grasping part. Second, another factor to
consider is theweight of an object, which in everyday life often is
associated with its size (i.e., large objects are usually heavier that
small objects). Similar to other object properties, the weight of an
object is represented in the brain, and such representations in-
volve the activation of motor areas (Chouinard et al., 2009;
Jenmalm et al., 2006). However, the selection of our stimuli does
not allow us to make dissociations between the object’s size and
either the size of its graspable part or the object’s weight. This
could be the topic of further investigations that may include
objects, the size of which would not correspond to the size of
their grasping part (e.g., small objects held with a power grip) or
to the objects’ weight (e.g., small objects made of dense
material).
Another parameter of our design that may have affected
the magnitude of the two affordance effects is the duration of
the interval that an object was displayed for. There is behav-
ioral and neurophysiological evidence that affordance effects
develop over time and reach their maximum when an object
is displayed for 1,000 or 1,200 ms (Phillips and Ward, 2002;
Vingerhoets et al., 2009b). However, recent work challenges
these findings and suggests that affordance effects are short-
lived and peak as early as 400 m after object display onset
(Makris et al., 2011, 2013). For this reason, we performed an
exploratory analysis on the RTs by dividing our data on the
basis of the duration of the display interval (i.e., 500, 750,
1,000, 1,250, and 1,500 ms). Although the small number of
responses per display interval prevents us from drawing safe
conclusions, we found that each affordance effect was present
in short and long intervals. We believe that the reason be-
tween the discrepant results with regards to Makris and col-
leagues’ studies may lie in the different task requirements.
The participants in the present study prepared to respond to
an arrow that appeared directly on the object, thus attending
(features of) the object, whereas in the Makris et al. (2011)
study, in which the effect of the duration of the display inter-
val was explicitly investigated, the requirement for the partic-
ipants was to respond to a change of the screen’s background
color, which might have directed the participants’ attention
away from the object. Certainly, this is a question that re-
quires systematic investigation and cannot be resolved by
the present findings.
Neuroimaging results: distinct representations
of function- and size-related affordances
All four main contrasts (SC > SInC, SInc > SC, FC > FInC
and FInC > FC) resulted in activation of the extrastriate cortex
(BA18 and BA19). This was an anticipated finding, because
this area is generally associated with object identification and
processing of object shape and location (Grill-Spector and
Malach, 2004; Kourtzi and Kanwisher, 2001; Schwarzlose
et al., 2008; Vingerhoets and Clauwaert, 2015; Whatmough
et al., 2002). On the other hand, there was a clear distinction in
the representation of function- and size-related affordances,
the former being represented in the posterior parietal cortex
(PPC) and the latter in prefrontal, premotor and primary sen-
sorimotor areas.
The contrast of function congruent over function incongru-
ent responses, which corresponds to the behavioral Bfunction
congruency effect,^ revealed two activation clusters in the left
PPC: one in the superior parietal lobule (SPL, BA 7), and a
much larger activation cluster in the inferior parietal lobule
(IPL, BA 40). Research on nonhuman primates has provided
strong evidence that areas within the PPC; namely, the medial
intraparietal (MIP) area and the anterior intraparietal (AIP)
area have a central role in the organization of reaching and
grasping movements, respectively (Andersen and Buneo,
2002; Grefkes and Fink, 2005). Although anatomical and
physiological differences between nonhuman and human pri-
mates demand cautious interpretation of analogous findings
across species, converging evidence suggests that the human
homologues of these areas lie mainly along the intraparietal
sulcus (IPS) but also within the SPL (for a review,
Vingerhoets, 2014). The SPL is typically associated with ac-
tion selection (Grafton et al., 1998) and online movement
programming (Striemer et al., 2011), and it is believed to be
part of the dorso-dorsal pathway (Binkofski and Buxbaum,
2013). The IPL sits on the opposite bank of the IPS, and it is
a critical area in motor attention (Rushworth et al., 2003),
representation of skilled movements (Haaland et al., 2000),
planning and execution of object/tool related actions
(Johnson-Frey et al., 2005; Randerath et al., 2010), and also
in the representation of object affordances (Grèzes and
Decety, 2002). The IPL is associated with the representation
of grasping (Binkofski et al., 1999; Grafton et al., 1996), but it
is probably not involved with the online-control of movement.
Instead, it is believed to be part of the ventro-dorsal pathway,
which is involved in the representation of long-term functional
affordances, possibly by storing conceptual knowledge that
may subserve the purposeful manipulation of object
(Buxbaum et al., 2006; Valyear et al., 2007; Vingerhoets
et al., 2009a). These functional roles of the SPL and of the
IPL are consistent with the concept of Bstable^ and Bvariable^
affordances. The IPL is considered to belong to a network that
represents actions related to time-invariant features of an
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objects, whereas the SPL is mostly associated to online inter-
actions with the object (Sakreida et al., 2016).
The opposite contrast (FInC > FC) showed two small clus-
ters of activation, one in the left posterior cingulate gyrus
(pCG, BA 23) and another one in the left (anterior) cerebel-
lum. The pCG has been shown to be involved in object iden-
tification (Ellis et al., 2006) and also in visuospatial processing
and orientation (Aguirre et al., 1996; Vogt et al., 2006). The
cerebellum is a structure with an integral role in sensorimotor
control and rapid movement prediction (Blakemore and
Sirigu, 2003; Stoodley and Schmahmann, 2009). Moreover,
research on the somatotopic organization of the cerebellum
has revealed that the activation of the IV and V lobes (as in
our study) is associated with the representation of hand-
performed tasks (Nitschke et al., 1996). Thus, the increased
pCG and cerebellar activation may reflect the representation
of the identity as well as of the location of the object with
respect to the participant’s hand and the automatic activation
of a rapid movement towards the graspable part of the object.
The contrast of size congruent over size incongruent re-
sponses, which corresponds to the behavioral Bsize
congruency^ effect, did not involve the PPC, but instead it
revealed activations in the prefrontal cortex (right BA9 and
medial BA8). The prefrontal cortex is associated with decision
making and also with object-based attentional selection acti-
vation (Cho et al., 2012; Coull et al., 1998; Hou and Liu,
2012); therefore, its involvement may reflect the participants’
decision to act upon the object with a size congruent grip. This
interpretation is supported by the increased activations in size-
congruent trials of the SMA proper and of primary sensori-
motor areas, generally associated with late-stage movement
selection, planning, and execution (Lee et al., 1999; Nachev,
et al., 2007) and, related to our experimental design, with hand
reaching and object grasping and manipulation (Hoshi and
Tanji, 2004; Kuhtz-Buschbeck et al., 2001).
The opposite contrast (SInC > SC) showed one cluster of
activation in the left middle frontal gyrus and more specifical-
ly in the left dorsal premotor cortex (PMd) (Mayka et al.,
2006). Grèzes et al. (2003) have reported that the left PMd is
involved in the implicit representation of object size
affordances. Furthermore, PMd activity has been related to
the accuracy of a (grasping) movement and also on the size
of object that a person intents to grasp (Castiello and
Begliomini, 2008; Grafton, 2010).
Taken together, our fMRI analysis shows that functional
and structural action affordances that are related to different
features of the same object are represented concurrently and to
a large extent in distinct brain areas. Action affordances that
are related to the identity/function of an object seem to involve
the PPC and especially the IPL (see FC > FInC contrast),
which is a structure associated with the long-term storage of
skillful actions (Binkofski and Buxbaum, 2013; Sakreida
et al., 2016). In addition, the involvement of the pCG and
the cerebellum (see FInC > FC contrast) suggests that the
location of the object’s handle may have activated a spatially
compatible reaching action. The argument that the functional
and the graspable end of an object could activate two compet-
ing response codes, although cannot be unequivocally
ascertained by the present data, agrees with the findings of
our recent EEG study (Kourtis and Vingerhoets, 2015), which
also showed a precedence of the function-related effect.
Whereas representations related to the skillful use of the
object and to a reaching movement toward the object seem
to be mostly formed in the PPC, the actual shaping of the
hand that matches the size of the object involves prefrontal,
premotor and primary sensorimotor areas. Interestingly
with regards to activation of premotor areas, the SMAwas
visible in the SC>SInC contract, whereas the PMd in the
opposite one. The activation of the SMA is consistent with
the notion of a Bvariable^ affordances network (Sakreida
et al., 2016). It is likely that reflects the updating of hand
shape on a trial-to-trial basis, by initiating the motor pro-
gram that fitted the size of the displayed object and possibly
inhibiting the motor program that was not required on a
given trial (Nachev et al., 2007). With regards to the Pmd
activation in the SInC>SC contrast, work on primates have
demonstrated that two actions can be concurrently repre-
sented in different neuronal population within the PMd
(Cisek and Kalaska, 2002). In the present study, it is likely
that both grasping actions were initially represented in the
PMd and that the display of an object may have activated
neuronal populations that coded a grasping action that was
congruent to the object’s size. However, the direction of the
arrow in size incongruent trials prompted the immediate
activation of the complementary grasping action. Given
the well-established role of the PMd in online movement
control and adaptation (Lee and van Donkelaar, 2006; Ward
et al., 2010), we propose that the increased PMd activation
in size-incongruent trials may reflect the switch from the
initially activated motor program to the one that was re-
quired for the performance of the task in a given trial.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the majority of the
activation clusters were located in the left hemisphere, which
is in accordance with the view that planning and execution of
object-directed actions are supported by a left-lateralized brain
network, irrespective of the hand that performs the action
(Johnson-Frey, 2004; Króliczak and Frey, 2009; Vingerhoets
et al., 2012).
In summary, our study demonstrates that individual fea-
tures of a graspable object may induce different type of action
affordances even when the perceiver has no intention to act
upon the object. These action affordances could be related to
the long-term skillful use and also to the immediate grasping
of the object. Our fMRI results show that different action
affordances can be represented concurrently and to a large
extent in distinct locations within the brain.
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